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1. Introduction
1 There are at least two strategies to understand the specific characteristics of human
beings. The most common is to emphasize those features that are unique to the species:
capabilities such as consciousness and self-awareness, knowledge of the mental states
of  others,  sense  of  humor,  sense  of  history  or  the  future,  language,  intentionality,
personality, capacity to develop a culture, or the capability to make artifacts (Glock
2008: 160). Such characteristics are unique to humans, and are generally considered a
point of superiority over other species. This attitude of emphasizing singularity, and
superiority as a consequence of that singularity, has revealed an anthropocentric bias,
common among philosophers and scientists alike. 
2 A  different  approach  to  analyzing  human  capabilities,  less  common,  although  not
without its illustrious proponents (for instance, Charles Darwin) has been to analyze
the degree to which these characteristics are already present in other species. That is,
singularity, if such a thing exists, does not derive from exclusivity, but depends on the
degree to which those capacities are present in different species. The argument is based
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on the  understanding  that  those  capabilities  come from adaptive  and  evolutionary
mechanisms. 
3 This paper explores the second strategy in analyzing a capability that has long been
considered unique to humans: the ability to manufacture and use artifacts. Don Ihde
and Lambros Malafouris, in a recent work (2019), espouse the consideration of human
beings as Homo faber, and point out that human beings are not unique in this capacity,
although they emphasize the complexity of the technical systems that humans build.
Other species efficiently transform their environment by creating and using artifacts.
The strategy employed here is grounded in classical pragmatism. Classical pragmatists
such  as  Chauncey  Wright,  Charles  S.  Peirce,  and  especially  John  Dewey,  combined
enactivist interpretations with the thesis of gradual continuity in nature (or synechism,
to use Peirce’s terminology).
4 The  first  section  of  the  paper  briefly  presents  Ihde  and  Malafouris’s  enactivist
explanation of human technical capabilities. The second describes Dewey’s notion of
experience  and  his  naturalistic  and  gradualistic  attitude.  The  third  presents  some
contemporary perspectives on nonhuman animals’ “tool using” in the fields of ethology
and  philosophy.  The  last  section  explores  the  possibility  of  extending  Dewey’s
explanation to other species as technical agents. His notion of experience combines the
enactivist viewpoint with evolutionary gradual continuity, and both can untangle some
explanatory  problems  related  to  the  characterization  of  those  objects  created  by
species other than humans.  Nonhuman animals develop different strategies to cope
with  their  changing  and  challenging  environments.  Among  those  evolutionary
strategies, some modify their environment with objects used or created for technical
purposes. Obviously, not all objects used or manufactured by a nonhuman animal are
technical  artifacts  –  otherwise,  even the  air  they breathe or  the  nourishment  they
ingest would be considered a technical artifact. However, restricting the creation of
technical artifacts to humans only, discounting every object used or created by another
species, is arguably an anthropocentric thesis.
 
2. Ihde and Malafouris’ Homo faber and Enactivism 
5 Ihde and Malafouris  (2019)  point  out  the  need to  assert  Bergson’s  consideration of
human beings as Homo faber:
Our  emphasis  falls  specifically  on  the  human  predisposition  for  technological
embodiment and creativity. We re-approach the notion Homo faber in a way that, on
the one hand, retains the power and value of this notion to signify the primacy of
making or creative material engagement in human life and evolution and, on the
other  hand,  reclaims  the  notion  from  any  misleading  connotations  of  human
exceptionalism (other animals make and use tools). (Ihde & Malafouris 2019: 195)
6 Ihde and Malafouris base their approach on two theses: the Postphenomenology that
Ihde  has  espoused  throughout  his  career,  and  the  Material  Engagement  Theory
developed  by  Malafouris.  They  emphasize  the  human  predisposition  toward
“technological  embodiment”  (Ihde  1990)  and  “creative  material  engagement”
(Malafouris 2014, 2015), as well as the varieties of skill, praxis and self-consciousness
(Ihde 2009; Malafouris 2008, 2014, 2015). Ihde and Malafouris point out that humans
change  the  environment  through  technology,  and  through  that  change,  in  turn,
humans also are transformed: “humans more than just adapting to their environments
are  also  actively  changing  them  (for  better  or  worse),  initiating  new  complex  co-
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evolutionary  paths  and  biosocial  synergies”  (Ihde  &  Malafouris  2019:  196).  They
suggest, as Bergson did before them, that humans change their own conditions and
their evolution through material transformation. The main difference between humans
and other species that also change their environment and create and use artifacts is
“the special place that fabrication and material culture has in human life and evolution.
Wherever technics  originated,  it  is  clear  that  humans expanded and multiplied the
interaction”  (ibid.:  197).  While  they  insist  that  those  capabilities  to  use  and  create
artifacts  are  not  unique  to  humans,  “to  various  degrees,  all  animals  are  niche
constructors  and  some  of  them  are  prolific  users  of  tools”  (ibid.),  the  amount  and
variety of technical relationships that humans are able to create is comparatively huge
(ibid.:  200).  According  to  Ihde  and  Malafouris,  the  difference  lies  in  the  fact  that
“humans  are  self-conscious  fabricators  that  become  (ontogenetically  and
phylogenetically) through their creative engagement with the material world. Other
tool-using  animals  are  not  self-conscious  fabricators  and  they  do  not  become  by
making; they merely manipulate material objects in an extractive foraging context and
in  predominantly  utilitarian  fashion”  (ibid.).  In  addition  to  self-consciousness,
intentionality is another characteristic that distinguishes humans from other animals:
not only because intentionality refers to the capacity to make plans or represent, but
“because of the way human intentional states are directly embodied and realised in the
hybrid space of situated action” (ibid.: 201). 
7 Nonetheless,  Ihde  and  Malafouris  do  not  consider  these  mental  capabilities  the
cornerstone in distinguishing between humans and other animals that create and use
artifacts.  An  enactivist  approach  can  be  used  to  explore  how  different  forms  of
materiality affect the bodies and senses of different animals, and why those animals,
with their specific physical structures, “invoke or afford certain ways of engaging and
using specific forms of materiality” (ibid.: 202). Enactivism is used to understand how
humans and other animals technically relate to the environment. However, Ihde and
Malafouris’ interpretation exclusively emphasizes the human side and leaves the door
open  to  examine  how  other  species  relate  technically  to  their  environment.  The
sections below explore that strategy, attempting to show how other species use and
create artifacts, suggesting some differences and similarities with human beings. For
that  purpose,  I  will  use  recent  discoveries  from  ethology  that  show other  species’
abilities and capacities to make and use tools, as well as an enactivist point of view.
Rather than taking Bergson as a reference, I use Dewey’s pragmatism and his naturalist,
gradualist,  and  non-dualist philosophy.  I  will  delve  into  the  different  adaptive
strategies that other species use, to showcase the differences between them. It does not
seem appropriate to put all these strategies into one broad set, where all species and
their creations are separated from the creations of humans, as the interpretations of
ethology and philosophy have suggested. 
 
3. Naturalism and Enactivism in Dewey’s Pragmatism
8 This  section  explores  an  extension  of  Dewey's  approach  to  nonhuman  animals  as
technical agents. There are several reasons to employ Dewey’s philosophy to analyze
the  capabilities  of  nonhuman  animals  to  make  and  use  artifacts:  his  anti-dualism,
manifested in his enactivist conception of cognition (Gallagher 2017: 48, 50), as well as
his naturalized and evolutionary perspective on living beings. Dewey, with his notions
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of  “experience,”  “perception,”  “problematic  situation,”  “habit”  and  “inquiry,”  was
probably the philosopher who developed that  perspective in  a  deeper way.  Several
studies  have  recently  linked  enactive  and  extended  conceptions  of  cognition  with
classical  pragmatism  (Gallagher  2009,  2014,  2017;  Fabbrichesi  2016).  While  it  is
emphasized  that  enactivism  has  its  roots  in  phenomenology,  there  are  very  few
mentions of pragmatists like Peirce, Mead and Dewey who developed very similar ideas.
For instance, the relation that Dewey defended in his philosophy between cognition
and action, or his criticism of the “spectator theory,” are common also in enactivism. 
9 Another good reason to use Dewey’s approach is that he can be considered the first
philosopher  of  technology  that  was  “interested  in  constructing  a  new  form  of
naturalism that would take into account continuities within nature[;] he looked for a
way to define technology with sufficient breadth” (Hickman 2009: 51). 
10 Last but not least, Dewey’s view that human cognition is always socially situated will
help us understand why technological artifacts made by humans and artifacts made by
nonhuman animals  are  often classified  into  different  categories.  Recent  discoveries
about  peculiarities  in  human  cognition  seem  to  uphold  Dewey’s  view  about  the
relevance  of  the  social  and  cultural  construction  of  technological  capabilities  and
knowledge.
11 As Trevor Pearce argues in a recent book, “pragmatism – the most famous movement in
American philosophy in the early 1900s – was the outgrowth of a rich conversation
between  late  ninetieth-century  philosophers,  biologists,  and  social  scientists.  For
pragmatists like Du Bois and Dewey, biological ideas such as evolution, adaptation, and
environment were central to debates about scientific inquiry, social reform, and moral
progress”  (Pearce  2020:  3).  Actually,  Dewey  was  one  of  the  first  philosophers  to
recognize the implications of Darwin’s theory: not only a new way of thinking about life
and  the  situation  of  human  beings  in  nature,  but  also  a  different  approach  to
philosophy (Popp 2012:  xi).  In this  new philosophical  strategy,  human beings,  their
experiences, capabilities and dispositions, must be understood in continuity with the
rest  of  living  beings:  “the  idea  of  eternally  fixed  species  gave  way  to  the  idea  of
temporal organisms caught up in the continual changes required of them in order that
they  might  come  to  terms  with  their  respective  (and  continually  changing)
environments”  (Hickman  1990:  31-2).  This  line  of  continuity with  other  biological
beings opens the door to a new interpretation of experience. In Dewey’s philosophy,
experience becomes a way of dealing with things: before knowing about something it is
necessary  to  have  experiences  with  those  things:  i.e.,  knowing  how  is  previous  to
knowing that (Kalpokas 2010: 182). 
12 In “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” Dewey summarizes his main criticisms of
the  traditional  conception  of  experience,  and  simultaneously  presents  his  own
perspective. In Dewey’s view, experience is: (i) regarded as “the intercourse of a living
being with its physical and social environment”; (ii) not a subjective, but an “objective
world which enters into the actions and suffering of men and undergoes modification
through their responses”; (iii) experimental, an effort to change what is taken as given:
“it is characterized by projection, by reaching forward into the unknown; connection
with a future is its salient trait”; (iv) “undergoing of an environment and a striving for
its  control  in  new  directions  is  pregnant  with  connections”;  and  (v)  when  it  is
conscious, it is full of inference (Dewey 1917/1998: 61). Just a few lines later, Dewey
considers the contribution of biology to his idea of experience: 
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Any account of experience must now fit into the consideration that experiencing
means living; and that living goes on in and because of an environing medium, not
in a vacuum. Where there is experience, there is a living being. Where there is life,
there  is  a  double  connection  maintained  with  the  environment.  In  art,
environmental  energies  constitute  organic  functions;  they  enter  into  them.  […]
Growth and decay, health and disease, are alike continuous with activities of the
natural  surroundings.  The  difference  lies  in  the  bearing  of  what  happens  upon
future life  activity.  From the standpoint  of  this  future  reference environmental
incidents fall into groups: those favorable-to-life activities and those hostile. (Ibid.:
61-2)
13 Dewey emphasizes two theses: naturalism and evolutionism. Organisms are active in
the  environment,  they  act  in  their  environing  medium,  changing  it  and  changing
themselves  in  the  process:  “adjustment  to  the  environment  means  not  passive
acceptance of the latter, but acting so that the environing changes take a certain turn”
(ibid.:  62). Experience is a matter of doings and sufferings – a process of continuous
adjustment. Thus, again from the Darwinian perspective, active experience is a strategy
for survival, and human beings are problem-solving animals. In Dewey’s own words:
“The first great consideration is that life goes on in an environment, not merely in it,
but because of it, through interaction with it” (Dewey 1934/2005: 12).
14 Experience connects perception and action. There is not a spectator who perceives the
external world and forms an internal (subjective) conception of it. As long as human
beings have evolved in a changing environment, they have been, and are, agents within
the  world;  they  are  part  of  it.  A  spectator  theory  of  knowledge  is  replaced  by  an
operational conception of knowledge: “In the orthodox view, experience is regarded
primarily as a knowledge affair. But to eyes not looking through ancient spectacles, it
assuredly appears as an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and
social environment” (Dewey 1917/1998: 6).
15 On the other hand, agents (not only humans) experience the world as possibilities for
action,  and  knowledge  is  the  result  of  two  experienced  situations:  “the  present
situation here and now and the future situation that is an outcome of some way of
acting” (Määttänen 2015: 12). The environment is not equivalent to the situation, but
for  an  environment  to  become  a  situation  an  agent  has  to  experience  it  as  such:
situations are constituted by the organism and the environment. Something may be a
situation for one agent but not for another. Being in a situation usually involves several
possibilities  of  action,  and  this  is  where  the  notions  of  problematic  situation  and
inquiry appear on the scene. When the agent faces a problematic situation, in the first
instance, it only perceives and acts, but if the action does not solve the situation, then
the normal situation becomes an occasion for inquiry. The agent starts to inquire, and
during the inquiry, the experience changes and becomes part of the agent’s knowledge,
available for use in addressing future problematic situations. The agent transforms the
problematic situation into a different, more comprehensible one. Dewey, influenced by
Peirce, who emphasized the role of resistance to hard facts as objective conditions of
action,  believed  agents  use  physical  and  cognitive  tools  to  deal  with  problematic
situations.
16 As the agent accumulates experiences and ways of  dealing with difficult  situations,
habits  are  formed.  Habits  are  not  permanently  fixed,  but  change  and  are  updated
through the perception of new problematic situations and the action carried out by the
agent.  The  agent  can  use  those  habits  for  similar  situations  in  “schematically
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structured sequences of acts” (Määttänen 2015: 33). The schematic structures do not
need to be propositional; they do not need to be expressed in a language. As long as
they ensure  some success  for  the  agent,  habits  are  reinforced.  Habit  formation for
Dewey, as it was for Peirce, is a form of reasoning, the most basic way of experiencing,
and it helps the agent to anticipate and cope with future situations. 
17 Some of an agent’s habits are “outgrowths of unlearned activities which are part of
man’s endowment at birth” (Dewey 1922/1988: 65). In other words, there are unlearned
habits  that  are  innate,  but  that  does  not  mean  that  those  habits  simply  emerge
spontaneously. An environment is necessary for them to emerge. In the case of social
agents, like human beings, the medium is social: “They are habits formed under the
influence of association with others who have habits already and who show their habits
in the treatment which converts a blind physical discharge into a significant anger”
(ibid.: 66). Popp suggests that if Dewey had known the notion of a genome, he would
have used it to explain the formation of habits (Popp 2012: 42).
18 However, agents can also have some control over problematic situations. Some agents
can learn, so they can gain the ability to assure their future in the present. They do so
by means of “reflective intelligence”: 
A being which can use given and finished facts as signs of things to come; which can
take given things as evidences of absent things, can, in that degree, forecast the
future;  it  can form reasonable expectation. It  is  capable of achieving ideas;  it  is
possessed  of  intelligence.  For  use  of  the  given  or  finished  to  anticipate  the
consequence  of  processes  going  on  is  precisely  what  is  meant  by  “ideas,”  by
“intelligence.” […] In the degree in which it can read future results in present on-
goings,  its  responsive  choice,  its  partiality  to  this  condition  or  that,  become
intelligent. Its bias grows reasonable. It can deliberately, intentionally, participate
in the direction of the course of affairs. (Dewey 1917/1998: 69) 
19 Dewey’s  account  of  inquiry  is  based on the theory of  evolution.  Human beings  are
natural agents,  and “the development of intelligence with respect to the control of
human environments  in  order  to  effect  increased  meaning  and  significance  within
those environments is for Dewey emergent within nature” (Hickman 1990: 10). To the
extent that human beings are just another species of animals, we acquire the ability to
reason in the same way that we obtain the rest of our cognitive capacities:  that is,
naturally. To use Dewey’s own turn of phrase, human beings have got nothing “out of
the a priori blue.”
20 Those capacities to control the environment, to deal with problematic situations, are
also present in other species, but to different degrees. In fact, this can be inferred by
“the principle of continuity”: qualities such as emotions and needs are merely natural
facts, and are the components of “qualitative thinking,” different from the discursive
way  of  thinking.  However,  discursive  thinking  is  impossible  without  qualitative
thinking.  “A  quality,  an  emotion,  a  need,  and  discursiveness,  all  these  are  equally
natural  phenomena,  which  go  together  in  every  process  of  experience;  they  are
constituted  in  relation  to  each  other,  and  are  directed  towards  reaching  new
meaningful senses or meanings” (Stankiewicz 2011: 109). 
21 As Gallagher (2014), and Cosmelli and Thompson (2010), among others, have pointed
out, Dewey’s characterization of cognition as the result of a dynamic interaction of the
body and the environment is consistent with enactivist arguments that cognition is not
just a matter of brain process, but that perception and thinking are fully integrated
with motor action (Gallagher 2009, 2014). However, Dewey also emphasizes that human
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cognition is always socially situated – an observation which is usually left out in the
enactive approach (Gallagher 2009: 39). 
We see that man is somewhat more than a neatly dovetailed psychical machine who
may be taken as an isolated individual, laid on the dissecting table of analysis and
duly anatomized. We know that his life is bound up with the life of society, of the
nation in the ethos and nomos; we know that he is closely connected with all the past
by the lines of education, tradition, and heredity. (Dewey 1884: 278)
22 The relevance of  the social  environment cannot be omitted,  from Dewey’s  point  of
view,  insofar  as  we  obtain  practical  knowledge  from  others,  “watching  them  act,
communicating with them, and learning from them through processes like imitation”
(Gallagher 2009: 39). Those elaborate and complex communicative abilities of human
beings make a substantial difference to other animals. In fact, it can be argued that the
gap between the technology of humans and nonhuman animals is based precisely on
those communicative and social capacities.
23 Dewey’s  interpretation  of  experience,  situation,  habits,  and  inquiry  has  many
implications  when  it  comes  to  technology.  Dewey  considered  that  “Technology”
signifies all the intelligent techniques by which the energies of nature and man are
directed and used in satisfaction of human needs. The creation of a new technology or a
new tool  arises  from new situations:  situations where the agent  realizes  that  some
familiar habit, technique, or tool has failed to work as usual. Then, the agent needs to
inquire, producing a new solution: a new habit, a new technique, or a new tool that is
more satisfactory than the previous one. For a new technological solution to appear,
intelligence, in the form of inquiry, is always required. As Hickman points out: “that
inquiry is a natural activity. He [Dewey] was naturalizing technology. He was telling us
that technology is what we use to improve our tools and techniques – to tune them up”
(Hickman 2001: 29-30).
24 Therefore, technology must be understood in a naturalized vein, and for that purpose,
Dewey uses three concepts:  “accommodation,” “adaptation,” and “adjustment” (also
“growth” in other texts). Accommodation is the reaction of the agent to changes in the
environment – to conditions that cannot be altered, such as changes in the weather. If
those  situations  last,  then the agent  acquires  a  habit:  “The two main traits  of  this
attitude, which I should like to call accommodation, are that it affects particular modes
of  conduct,  not  the  entire  self,  and  that  the  process  is  mainly  passive”  (Dewey
1934/1989:  12).  The  agent  may  have  a  more  active  reaction  and,  instead  of
accommodating  him  or  herself,  modify  the  conditions,  changing  the  situation to
accommodate (i.e.  to adapt) them to the agent’s own purposes.  This is  what Dewey
understands  as  adaptation.  Adjustment  occurs  when  there  are  changes  also  in  the
agents, and those changes are the result of changes in the world. “They relate not to
this  and that  want  in  relation  to  this  and that  condition  of  our  surroundings,  but
pertain  to  our  being  in  its  entirety.  Because  of  their  scope,  this  modification  of
ourselves is enduring […]. It is a change of will conceived as the organic plenitude of
our  being,  rather  than  any  special  change  in  will”  (ibid.:  12-3).  Therefore,
accommodation occurs in both ways: the world changes (accommodates) by the action
of agents, adapting environmental conditions to their needs; and the agent changes
(adjusts) to environmental conditions. 
25 Dewey identifies the inquiry involved in those activities and equates it with technology.
Some  living  beings  use  mediating  objects  –  tools  to  bring  about  adaptation.  This
“naturalization of technology” can be easily applied to agents other than humans. “It is
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not something above or apart from nature, but rather the cutting edge of evolutionary
development” (Hickman 2009: 51).
Viewed as  a  part  of  a  larger  picture,  habits  are  tools  of  adjustment.  A  habit  is
something that has a certain generality of application. It is something that has been
tried out and found to be capable of serving certain purposes. Viewed from this
perspective, as habits of a sort,  hammers and saws become continuous with the
other habits developed over millennia by higher order primates, for example, in
their  attempts  to  adjust  to  changing  environmental  conditions.  Viewed  in  this
perspective, to say that human beings are uniquely technological animals is not to
place  them  outside  and  above  nature,  but  within  nature  and  a  part  of  it.  Our
activities differ from those of our non-human relatives and ancestors not in kind,
but only in level of complexity. (Ibid.: 52)
26 The  connection  between  perception  and  action  in  the  formation  of  habits  is  not
exclusive  to  human agents.  Actually,  if  the  notion of  habit  also  encompasses  those
actions that are part of innate behavior, then every living being experiences and is part
of the environment. The principle of continuity, applied to all living beings, provides a
framework  to  explain  gradual  differences  in  capabilities  and  kinds  of  actions  and
habits.
27 Before making use of Dewey’s notions for other animals, it might be useful to briefly
summarize the main approaches of contemporary ethology on this topic and the few
philosophers  who  have  suggested  an  interpretation  for  the  technical  abilities  of
nonhuman animals. 
 
4. Nonhuman Technical Capacities as Viewed in
Ethology and Philosophy 
28 Technical  abilities of  nonhuman animals have been analyzed in ethology under the
umbrella of “tool use.” A great many field and laboratory studies have been conducted
to analyze other animals’ abilities to create and use tools. In philosophy of technology,
there  are  a  few  exceptions  that  take  these  abilities  into  account.  Among  those
exceptions, the contributions of Beth Preston (1998), and more recently, Ashley Shew
(2017) stand out. 
29 There are several definitions and classifications of “tool use” in ethology. All of them
agree that tools must be external objects to the nonhuman animal that uses the object,
avoiding the inclusion of an animal’s use of its own organ in the category (Boswall
1977a, 1977b, 1978, 1983, and Beck 1980). Most definitions also agree that the object has
to be dynamic (Van Lawick-Goodall  1970:  195;  Alcock 1972: 464;  St Amant & Horton
2008:  1203;  Bentley-Condit  &  Smith  2010;  Schumaker,  Walkup  &  Beck  2011:  5):  i.e.
dynamically used by the animal. Nevertheless, those who want to include things like
birds’ or insects’ nests do not agree with this restriction (Pierce 1986: 96). Likewise,
there is a general agreement that those objects internally produced, like spiders’ webs,
or silkworms’ cocoons, cannot be considered tools stricto sensu (only Gould 2007 hold
otherwise). 
30 There  is  more  agreement  about  the  definition  of  “tool  manufacture.”  Schumaker,
Walkup and Beck define “tool manufacture” as “simply any structural modification of
an object or an existing tool so that the object serves, or serves more effectively, as a
tool. […] Modification means alteration of the dimensional physical characteristics of
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the tool, not simply its spatial orientation” (Schumaker, Walkup & Beck 2011: 11). They
list four types of tool manufacture: detach, subtract, add/combine and reshape.
31 The two most  extensive  classifications  of  tool  use  have  been proposed by  Bentley-
Condit and Smith (2009) and Shumaker, Walkup and Beck (2011). Bentley-Condit and
Smith (2009: 190-1) suggest a classification of tool use in ten categories, distinguishing
between  different  activities  that  can  be  performed  with  those  tools.  Likewise,
Shumaker, Walkup, and Beck suggest a classification based on a functional argument,
but  their  classification  is  broader,  including  22  types  of  actions  that  animals  can
perform.
32 In ethology, tools are classified according to the “function” that nonhuman animals can
perform with them, and subsequently according to their shape, structure, or any other
physical characteristic. To avoid the charge of anthropomorphism, all of them avoid
using  “intentions  behind  the  actions”  that  nonhuman  animals  perform  with  those
objects. There is a long tradition in nonhuman animal behavior studies of exercising
great  caution  about  using  the  same  kind  of  explanations  for  human  behavior  and
nonhuman animals’ behavior. The claim that anthropomorphism is a fallacy was made
in order to identify and root out anecdotalism (like when Darwin and Romanes were
trying to establish the continuity of human and nonhuman traits and suggested that
some  nonhuman  traits  should  be  understood  using  traits  that  humans  have).
Anthropomorphism is defined as “the attribution of human traits, specifically human
psychological  traits,  to non-humans” (Fitzpatrick 2008:  235),  or more precisely “the
attribution  of  human  psychological,  social,  or  normative  properties  to  non-human
animals” (Andrews & Huss 2014: 711). However, in principle, there is nothing wrong
with attributing human properties to nonhuman animals. As Keeley (2004) has pointed
out “we simply cannot know a priori whether a given human trait is or is not uniquely
human, or whether a given species shares any human traits” (Keeley 2004: 533). In the
same vein,  Fitzpatrick  points  out  that  “This  [anthropomorphism]  in  itself,  is  not  a
mistake, since humans surely do share many psychological traits with other species”
(Fitzpatrick 2008: 235). The problem arises when human psychological characteristics
are attributed to nonhuman animals with a lack of supporting evidence – i.e. when it is
possible  to  maintain  a  non-anthropomorphic  explanation  better  supported  by
evidence. 
33 Beth Preston (1998) was the first philosopher to consider those definitions of “tools”
and  “tool  use”  conventionally  used  among  ethologists,  and  suggests  a  different
theoretical framework, based on Martin Heidegger’s notion of equipment (Zeug) as a
substitute for  what she considers “folk categories.”  Heidegger strongly opposes the
distinction between subject and object that comes from the Cartesian tradition, and
believes that some mental capabilities such as intentionality or representation bridge
the gap between subject and object. From Heidegger’s perspective, the subject-object
relationship has to be understood in terms of being-in-the-world. Being is divided into
two: human-being (Dasein), and non-human being. Non-human being, in turn, is divided
into  Zuhandenheit and  Vorhandenheit,  “readiness-at-hand”  and  “presence-at-hand”
respectively, and Zeug. The latter is a special category referring to those things that
humans encounter in everyday practical activities, like the tools or materials that we
often refer  to  as  “equipment.”  Equipment  is  constituted functionally,  it  is  a  useful
thing, and it is used in order to get something done. In order for an object to actually
function as a useful thing, it has to fit into the context of a meaningful activity. The
A Pragmatist Explanation of Technical Capabilities in Nonhuman Animals
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XIII-1 | 2021
9
English  translation  of  Heidegger’s  term  for  such  fitting  [Bewandtnis]  is  involvement:
objects have an involvement with other objects. Things are classed as equipment on the
basis of their functionality. Therefore, functionality is a defining feature of equipment,
and equipment is what it is only when actually used. 
34 Function  can  only  be  understood  through  manipulation.  The  actual  use  of  the
equipment results in first-hand understanding of it. However, Heidegger also suggested
a second-hand understanding of the equipment, when other human beings, even if they
are  not  users  of  the  equipment,  know  its  public  characteristics:  “his  [Heidegger’s]
analysis of equipmentality explicates equipment in terms of function, and function in
terms of  cultural  norms of  behaviour  instituted  by  the  ‘they’”  (Preston 1998:  538).
Therefore, “even though the functioning of a piece of equipment becomes available
through manipulation, our understanding of equipment also depends on social norms
and conventions for how things are normally used” (Susi & Ziemke 2005: 10). 
35 Preston is aware that applying Heidegger’s proposal about equipment to nonhuman
animals presents some difficulties. First of all, Heidegger’s Dasein refers only to human
beings (or, at least, to beings with our mental capacities), and sets aside (in a lower
category) stones, plants, and nonhuman animals. Secondly, the “they” responsible for
cultural norms are other human beings. Even today, the idea that a nonhuman animal
culture exists is controversial,  but in Heidegger’s works, it is not even a possibility.
However, Preston believes Heidegger’s notion of equipment can also be applied to the
case of other animals, because the difference between humans and nonhuman animals
is a matter of degree, rather than an absolute difference (Preston 1998: 537-8). On the
subject of norms, Preston points out that philosophers and scientists in biology and the
behavioral sciences often use the concept of function, which is a normative term. 
36 Another exception to the oblivion in philosophy about the technological capabilities of
nonhuman animal is the recent book by Ashley Shew (2017). Shew holds that categories
like culture, intelligence, and planning are not unique to humans. Her goal is to provide
an explanation for some behaviors and capabilities that,  from her point of view, fit
under  the  umbrella  of  technological  knowledge.  In  this  sense,  Shew  develops  an
“epistemology  of  technology”  that  considers  some  of  the  actions  and  products  of
nonhuman animals as technological in character (Shew 2017: 1). Therefore, her claim is
more  epistemological  than  ontological:  technological  knowledge  includes,  in  her
account, nonhuman animal tool making and tool use. Additionally, Shew argues that
“many  cases  of  animal  artifact-use  evince  the  same  qualities  that  define  human
technology use: planning, problem-solving, design, and innovation” (ibid.: 2). 
37 Instead of using just one philosophical account of technology, as Preston does, Shew
uses several approaches: the epistemological, the anthropological, and the sociological
(in Mitcham’s terms, see Mackey 1972). Shew examines those approaches for guidance
in distinguishing between simple tool use, tool manufacture, and the use of technology.
38 Technological knowledge has two dimensions: know-how – a kind of knowledge that
requires skills – and encapsulated information – in Davis Baird’s terms (2002, 2004),
thing knowledge, knowledge that is encapsulated in technology or in a device, and that
may or may not have a theoretical counterpart. With this two-axis map, Shew considers
that  “we  can  actually  unite  discussions  of  design  and  function  happening  in  both
biology and engineering” (Shew 2017: 116). 
39 On the one hand, the map allows us to explain the capacities of groups of nonhuman
animals  well  known  in  the  literature  for  using  and  making  tools:  chimpanzees,
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bottlenose dolphins, or New Caledonian crows. On the other, it allows us to classify
particular nonhuman animal products from the perspective of thing knowledge: spider
webs, beaver dams, and other nonhuman animal constructions. 
40 Both approaches have great merit,  raising their voices in philosophy of technology,
which focuses mainly on human capacities and creations. Their points of view are not
opposite, but account for nonhuman technical capacities in two different realms: the
ontological, and the epistemological. The Heideggerian notion of equipment may be an
interesting starting point. However, sensu stricto, it can be too narrow for explaining
nonhuman creations. On the other hand, the distinction between know-how and thing
knowledge is closely connected with human capabilities for representing and making
knowledge explicit.  In the next section, I  will  explore extending Dewey’s notions of
experience, habit, problematic situation, adaptation, and accommodation to nonhuman
agents. Considering his enactivist and naturalist perspective, it is quite likely that if
Dewey had known what ethology is telling us about nonhuman animal behavior, he
would have extended his notions to other animals as well. 
 
5. Venturing a Pragmatist Interpretation of Nonhuman
Animals’ Technical Capacities
41 Using Dewey’s terms, we can say that all  animals inhabit  the same world,  but they
experience different  environments,  different  situations,  and modify  them in different
ways, depending on their approach to the problematic situation, as well as their physical
and  cognitive  capabilities.  For  instance,  dolphins  experience  very  different
environments  from  the  environment  experienced  by  New  Caledonian  crows,  and
therefore face different problematic situations. For one, dolphins, which live in aquatic
environments, have the capacity to echo-localize, as well as a flexible and social way of
learning.  Since  dolphins  do not  have hands,  they use  their  mouths  and flippers  to
manipulate  the  environment,  such  as  when  they  select  and  put  on  their  rostrum
sponges from the seabed, for protection as they forage in the coarse sand (Krützen et al.
2005).  Dolphins’  habits will  depend  on  these  factors:  the  environment  they  inhabit
(aquatic), their physical structure (they do not have hands, but they use their toothed
beaks or their tails to manipulate their environment), and their cognitive and social
capabilities (they are very intelligent animals,  with brains among the largest in the
animal kingdom, and they live in very intricate social organizations). New Caledonian
crows, meanwhile, live in a terrestrial and aerial environment. They do not have hands
either, but use their beaks to manipulate the environment and deal with their specific
situations, like pulling worms out of the trees. Some of them have learned some of
these strategies through social learning, but others are also able to find new solutions
for themselves. Therefore, the environment plus the animal’s capacities, both physical
and cognitive, must be analyzed together to understand how different species use and
manipulate artifacts in different ways. 
42 Some problematic situations are solved with the adaptation of the environment to the
necessities of the animal through the creation of an artifact (e.g. a nest), but others are
solved in a more passive way with an accommodation to new circumstances: a new habit
(for instance, trying a new kind of food), or modification of an old one (like foraging in
a different place). When agents change in the long term as a result of these adaptations,
in  evolutionary  terms,  and  also  in  Dewey’s  terms,  adjustments occur.  It  may  be
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debatable that specific agents change, and it would be better to refer to adjustment as
species-wide changes, or in other words, evolution of the species (Figure 1).
 
Figure 1
43 Those problematic and particular situations that are solved with an active adaptation
can  lead  to  different  kinds  of  solutions,  some  of  which  can  be  achieved  through
modification of habits (such as behavioral changes in foraging times, or looking for new
places to rest or hide). In some cases, however, animals can use mediating objects to find
a solution for the problematic situation. Of course, not every mediating object used by
an agent is necessarily an artifact (for example, water is an object used to quench the
thirst, and also for cleaning, but it is not always necessarily an artifact). An artifact
could be defined as an extreme case of a mediating object created or used to solve a
problematic situation in an efficient way. Sometimes the object already exists, and it is
picked out from among other natural  objects for its  special  structure (Oswalt  1973,
refers  to  them  as  naturfacts)  –  a  structure  that  is  identified  by  the  animal  for  its
outstanding  features  for  solving  the  problematic  situation.  Take,  for  example,  the
stones that sea otters (Enhydra lutris) put on their thorax to open mollusks like mussels
(observed  by  Hall  &  Schaller  in  1964),  or  the  rocks  used  as  an  anvil  for  opening
cockleshells by blackspot tuskfish (Choerodon schoenleinii) (Jones, Brown & Gardner 2011:
865).  Yet,  in other cases,  the object does not exist  before,  and the agent creates it,
either by modifying natural objects,1 or by combining and assembling different natural
objects.2 The structure of the object allows the animal to deal with the problematic
situation, transforming it into a non-problematic one. 
44 On  the  other  hand,  it  might  be  useful  to  distinguish  between  different  technical
solutions based on behavioral flexibility to develop those solutions (Figure 2).  On one
extreme, there are unlearned habits displayed in an inflexible way. Some nonhuman
animals exhibit innate dispositions to transform the environment by making objects:
for instance, spiders’ webs or butterflies’ silk cocoons. A salient feature of these objects
is  that  they are  made always  in  the  same way –  i.e.  the  nonhuman animal  cannot
modify  or  improve  them.  Another  step  in  the  continuous  spectrum  of  material
solutions created by nonhuman animals are those objects, like birds’ nests, which can
be enhanced through experience and learning capabilities. Those improvements can be
made to the structure, materials, strength, or other qualities of the object. However,
they still largely depend on the innate dispositions of the nonhuman animal. In that
sense,  those  nonhuman  animals  will  create  the  object  as  part  of  their  extended
phenotype  (Dawkins  1982).  The  animal  could  not  survive  or  reproduce  unless  they
fabricate those objects. However, animals learn by trial and error and have the capacity
to introduce some variations into future objects based on past experiences.
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45 Near  the  end  of  the  spectrum  would  be  artifacts  created  using  what  Dewey  calls
reflective  intelligence.  In  these  cases,  nonhuman  animals  show  capacities  such  as
anticipation, and social learning. The main difference between the solutions based on
reflective intelligence and those achieved in other artefact-based ways of dealing with
problematic situations lies in the outstanding creativity involved in the former. Those
nonhuman animals can find new solutions, learn by imitation of other group members,
and  even  plan  ahead,  collecting  previously  used  objects  for  future  problematic
situations (though not all members of these species find the same solution to the same
kind  of  problem).  So  far,  the  group  of  species  that  ethologists  have  identified  as
possessing  these  capacities  is  quite  small,  including  chimpanzees,  orangutans,  New
Caledonian crows, woodpecker finches, and capuchin monkeys (Hunt 1996, 2000; Hunt
& Gray 2002,  2003;  Boesch,  Head & Robbins 2009;  Fragasz et  al.  2004;  Visalberghi &
Fragaszy 2009; Tebbich et al. 2001). 
46 Human beings have exceptional capabilities that result in highly complex technology.
Some authors have pointed out among those exceptional capabilities: (i) the ability to
reason in terms of non-observable and/or hidden causes (Waldmann & Hagmayer 2005;
Kushnir  et  al.  2005;  Saxe  &  Wexler  2005),  (ii)  the  ability  to  distinguish  between
“genuine” and “spurious” causes (Lien & Cheng 2000); (iii) the ability to reason the link
between the effects and their possible causes (Waldmann & Holyoak 1992) and planning
their  own interventions in a  quasi-experimental  way to elucidate ambiguous causal
relationships  (Hagmayer  et  al.  2007).  In  addition,  human  beings  develop  “cultural
learning” – a strategy different from social learning, as human culture is the only one
dependent on teaching and imitation, together with language and perspective taking
(Tomasello  1994).  In  the  case  of  cultural  learning,  an  individual  human  invents
something  at  a  certain  time,  another  learns  how  to  do  it,  and  then  modifies  and
improves it.  Later, a new generation learns the new and improved version, and the
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improvement process starts again – and so on through generations (Tomasello 2000:
38). In the case of social learning – a capacity shown by many other species – animals
learn by imitation in the presence of a conspecific. In contrast, in the case of cultural
learning,  the human being is  able to make an interpretation of the function of the
artifact without the presence of the inventor or the manufacturer, and also change that
function, improving the original artifact or making a new one based on the old. Michael
Tomasello has called this effect the ratchet effect, and it seems to be unique to humans:
“some  individual  or  group  of  individuals  first  invented  a  primitive  version  of  the
artifact  or  practice,  and  then  some  later  user  or  users  made  a  modification,  an
improvement, that others then adopted perhaps without change for many generations,
at  which  point  some  other  individual  or  group  of  individuals  made  another
modification, which was then learned and used by others, and so on over historical
time in what has sometimes been dubbed ‘the ratchet effect’” (Tomasello 1999: 5). The
process  of  accumulative cultural  evolution requires  not  only creative invention but
also, and most importantly, a faithful social transmission that can function as a ratchet
to prevent slipping back. Newly invented artifacts or practices continue in their new
and improved form until a new modification or improvement arrives (Tomasello 2000:
5). Therefore, social transmission – that is, the communicative and social capacities of
the human being, including the immense variety of artifacts (technological, social or
artistic) – has led to an enormous change. This conclusion is consistent with Dewey’s
emphasis  on  the  social  condition  of  human  cognition.  In  Dewey’s  own  words:  “All
inquiry proceeds within a cultural matrix which is ultimately determined by the nature
of social relations. […] The techniques available at any given time depend upon the
state of material and intellectual culture” (Dewey 1938/1991: 487). Dewey also applied
these ideas in his pedagogical theory and in his consideration of the construction of
scientific knowledge. 
47 In summary, each animal has to deal with its own environment, its own problematic
situations, with its specific physical and cognitive capacities. Every species inhabits a
specific  environment,  but  copes  with  it  in  different  ways.  In  their  interaction,  the
environment and the species both change. In some cases, changes are manifested using
objects  available  in the environment,  and in other cases those changes require the
creation of a new object – an object that is the outcome of the purposeful manipulation
of the environment. Human strategies to adapt to the environment are more complex
than those used by other species, which is not to say that human strategies do not also
arise from natural and evolved capacities. Dewey’s notions of experience, problematic
situation, habit and inquiry, adjustment and adaptation are broad enough to include
not just human beings, but also other agents, avoiding anthropocentric explanations
that set human capabilities apart from those of other animals. 
 
6. Conclusions
48 In this paper, I have explored a different approach for explaining technical capabilities
of nonhuman animals. Traditionally, humans have been distinguished by their unique
abilities. However, new scientific research shows that humans are not as unique as we
thought. 
49 Using  an  enactivist  approach  can  be  very  useful  to  understand  that  living  beings
inhabit the world and cope with their challenges in different ways, depending on their
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physical, structural, cognitive, or social characteristics. Some animals have the ability
to transform their environment, creating new objects to solve their difficulties: objects
that fit into the category of technical artifacts. 
50 Here,  I  have  explored  the  possibility  of  employing  several  of Dewey’s  notions  to
account  for  nonhuman technical  capabilities.  His  non-dichotomous  perspective,  his
vindication of the theory of evolution, and his considerations about artifacts may be
helpful  in  understanding  that  human  technical  capabilities  are  simply  different  in
degree  from  those  of  nonhuman  animals.  Another  scientific  approach  that  can  be
analyzed in Dewey’s terms is the Niche construction perspective (Lewontin 1982, 2000, and
more recently Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman 2013). However, this deserves its own
analysis: one that I wish to develop in depth in future works. 
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NOTES
1. Until now, ethologists have identified four species of nonhuman animals that can manufacture
tools: chimpanzees (Pan troglodites), orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), New Caledonian Crows (Corvus
moneduloides),  and  Woodpecker  finches  (Cactospiza  pallida).  Chimpanzees  in  the  wild  were
observed  making  and  using  artifacts  such  as modified  tree  branches  to  fish  termites,  stone
hammers and anvils, tree branches for dipping into honey, or leaf sponges for drinking water
(Van Lawick-Goodal 1970; Boesch & Boesh 1990). A population of Sumatran orangutan modify
and use tree branches to access insects and Neesia seeds (a kind of fruit with a hard shell, coated
with irritant hairs) (van Schaik, Fox & Sitompul 1996). Crows of New Caledonia have the ability to
make some objects to extract worms from bark trees. They select from among the branches and
leaves of the trees and shape them three-dimensionally. They are able to perform these actions
with a high level  of  standardization in manufacturing,  high levels  of  skill  in production and
cumulative changes in the design of objects (Hunt & Gray 2004).  Woodpecker finches modify
twigs and thorns to extract arthropods from holes or cracks in bark. They shape these objects,
shortening or cleaning them of lateral branches that prevent proper and efficient use (Tebbich &
Bshary 2004). 50% of the food that they eat during the dry season is obtained by using these
hooks.
2. Nests built by nonhuman animals include those built by birds and insects, as well as those
made by mammals, amphibians, fish, reptiles, and spiders. Nests can involve the collaborative
work of more than one agent and, in many cases, a large number of them. A few examples are:
the hives of  the honey bee (Apis  mellifera),  built  by the workers of  the colony,  with complex
internal structure (Pierce 1986: 100); and the nests of Macrotermes termites of Africa (Wilson
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1975). Among nonhuman animals, birds are probably the most impressive nest builders: “The
techniques with which birds build their nests […] range from the sculpting of burrows or cavities
from substrate excavation, through the moulding of mud or salivary mucus by vibrating head
and/or shaping breast and feet movements,  the piling up of materials where subsequent bill
manipulations, coupled with side-to-side shaking movements, may be made in order to entangle
or intertwine nest  components,  to the weaving of  hanging nest  baskets using intricate tuck,
looping,  interlocking,  winding,  and  knotting  bill-made  stitches  to  fasten  and  secure  grassy
materials” (Breen, Guillette & Healy 2016: 84). Among mammals, beavers (genus Castor) modify the
environment using huge logs, branches (which they themselves cut) and mud structures to dam
streams and create ponds where they build their lodges, also built with branches and mud.
ABSTRACTS
Human technological  capabilities  have  been analyzed  as  a  distinctive  feature  of  the  species.
However, recent discoveries in the field of ethology show that other species besides humans are
also able to use and make tools. Ihde and Malafouris (2019) have suggested analyzing nonhuman
animals’ technical capabilities using an enactivist framework, as they do for humans. This paper
explores a pragmatist approach, combining gradual evolutionary continuity with enactivism. I
will  characterize  nonhuman  animals’  technical  capacities  using  John  Dewey’s  notions  of
experience,  problematic  situation,  accommodation,  adaptation,  and  inquiry.  The  technical
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